Identity, Credentials, and Secrets

MAC separates human clients, workers, reviewers, deployers, and global fleet administrators. Tokens are scoped and revocable. Worker credentials bind to one agent identity; an agent cannot claim to be a peer by changing a JSON field.

Secrets are encrypted at rest, revealed only through an audited access handle, and redacted from listings. Values should arrive on standard input or from a protected file, never as command-line arguments.

mac --db "$DOCS_DB" admin init
printf '%s' 'tutorial-value-not-a-real-credential' | \
  mac --db "$DOCS_DB" admin secret set tutorial-secret --from-stdin \
  --scopes '{"capabilities":["docs"]}' --created-by human
mac --db "$DOCS_DB" admin secret list | grep '\*\*\*REDACTED\*\*\*' >/dev/null
mac --db "$DOCS_DB" admin secret audits
mac admin client enroll --help >/dev/null

Fleet Git credentials are projected by source name and recorded only as secret-free operational learning: host class, operation, outcome, failure classification, and remediation. Never place raw tokens, authenticated URLs, or secret-bearing output into task evidence or memory.

Production clients should use mac admin login and secure profiles. The shared admin token is a recovery authority, not the default credential for every worker.